<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Vincent Gable's Blog &#187; Password</title>
	<atom:link href="http://vgable.com/blog/tag/password/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://vgable.com/blog</link>
	<description>my weblog.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Nov 2011 22:20:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator>
		<item>
		<title>iPhone Password Correction</title>
		<link>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/08/19/iphone-password-correction/</link>
		<comments>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/08/19/iphone-password-correction/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2009 01:27:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Vincent Gable</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Accessibility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[iPhone]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Usability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Authentication]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Auto-Correction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Password]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Typing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Typos]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://vgable.com/blog/?p=373</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Idea: your iPhone knows your passwords, so when you make a small typo, it corrects it for you. There are obviously major security concerns here. But I believe they can be acceptably mitigated by the phone itself. Someone would have to physically use the iPhone to get password correction, and correctly could only happen on [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Idea: your iPhone knows your passwords, so when you make a small typo, <em>it corrects it for you</em>.</p>
<p>There are obviously major security concerns here. But I believe they can be acceptably mitigated by the phone itself. Someone would have to <em>physically</em> use the iPhone to get password correction, and correctly could only happen on the first or second password attempt. Also, correction could be limited to the kinds of typos a person would make.</p>
<p>Passwords are broken by machines, not people. I believe password correction can help people, without substantially helping machines, and compromising security.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s hard to type precisely on an iPhone&#8217;s virtual keyboard. That prevents people from using secure passwords, and that hurts security. Because password correction helps people actually use strong passwords, it should be to be a net security <em>benefit</em>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/08/19/iphone-password-correction/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Pass Phrases, Not Passwords</title>
		<link>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/06/01/pass-phrases-not-passwords/</link>
		<comments>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/06/01/pass-phrases-not-passwords/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2009 14:33:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Vincent Gable</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Accessibility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Usability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Authentication]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pass-Phrases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Password]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Randomness]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://vgable.com/blog/2009/06/01/pass-phrases-not-passwords/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Thomas Baekdal makes a convincing argument for using pass-phrases not passwords (via). It&#8217;s excellent advice, and I know I&#8217;m not alone in having advocated it for years. My keyboard has 26 letters, 10 numbers, and 12 symbol keys, like ~. All but spacebar make a different symbol when I hold down shift, giving me 93 [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.baekdal.com/articles/Usability/password-security-usability/">Thomas Baekdal makes a convincing argument for using pass-<em>phrases</em> not pass<em>words</em></a> (<a href="http://delicious.com/hublicious">via</a>). It&#8217;s excellent advice, and I know I&#8217;m not alone in having advocated it for years. </p>
<p>My keyboard has 26 letters, 10 numbers, and 12 symbol keys, like ~. All but spacebar make a different symbol when I hold down shift, giving me 93 characters to use in my passwords. But <strong> the number of words that can make-up a pass-phrase is <em><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_language#Number_of_words_in_English">easily</a></em> in the 100,000s</strong>. Estimating exactly how big is a bit tricky, but I will stick with 250,000 here (I think it&#8217;s an <em>undercount</em>, more on this later).</p>
<h3>We Know How To Talk</h3>
<p>The human brain has an <em>amazing</em> aptitude for language. But &#8220;passwords&#8221; aren&#8217;t really words, so they don&#8217;t tap into this ability. In fact, <strong>we often use <em>words</em> to try and remember the nonsense-characters of a password</strong>.</p>
<p>Wouldn&#8217;t it make more sense to just use the words directly, if we can remember them more easily?</p>
<h3>Hard For Computers, Not Hard For Us</h3>
<p><strong>People <em>feel</em> that if security system A is harder for them to use then system B, then A must be harder for an attacker to bypass</strong>. But the facts don&#8217;t always match this intuition.</p>
<p>What authentication code do you think is harder for a bad guy to hack, the 7 character <a href="http://strongpasswordgenerator.com/">strong password</a> &#8220;1Ea.$]/&#8221;, or the mnemonic for the first 3 characters, &#8220;One Elvis Amazon&#8221;? Certainly &#8220;1Ea.$]/&#8221; is harder for a person to remember. It <em>feels</em> like it <em>should</em> be harder to break. But a computer, not a person, is going to be doing the guessing, and all it cares about is how big the search space is. There are 93<sup>7</sup> possible 7 character passwords. Let&#8217;s say there are 250,000 possible English words (more on that figure later). Then there are 250,000<sup>3</sup> 3 word combinations &#8212; meaning an attacker would have to do 260 <em>times</em> more work to guess &#8220;One Elvis Amazon&#8221; than to guess &#8220;1Ea.$]/&#8221;.</p>
<p>With pass phrases, easier for the good guys is also harder for the bad guys.</p>
<h3>Exactly How Much Harder</h3>
<p>The &#8220;250,000 word&#8221; figure is a bunch of hand-waiving, but I believe it&#8217;s an <em>undercount</em>. I picked it, because I wanted a round number to crunch; <a href="http://www.baekdal.com/articles/Usability/password-security-usability/">it&#8217;s what Thomas Baekdal</a> picked; and it&#8217;s about the size of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Words_(Unix)">the Mac OS X words file</a>,</p>
<pre>
$ wc -l /usr/share/dict/words
  234936</pre>
<p>But liberally descriptive linguists say that <a href="http://www.languagemonitor.com/?p=368">the 1,000,000th word will be added to the English Language on June 10th, 2009</a>. The more conservative <cite>Webster&#8217;s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged</cite> list 475,000 English words. Obviously <strong>neologisms, slang, and archaic terms are fine for pass phrases</strong>. People <em>like</em> <a href="http://www.google.com/search?rls=en-us&#038;q=word+of+the+day&#038;ie=UTF-8&#038;oe=UTF-8">discovering quirky words</a>. I see far more more people embracing the login, &#8220;kilderkin of locats&#8221;, then rejecting it.</p>
<p><strong>Different conjugations (can) count as different words in pass-phrases.</strong> There&#8217;s only one entry in a dictionary for swim, but swim, swimming, swam, etc. make for distinct pass-phrases (eg. &#8220;Elvis <strong>swims</strong> fast&#8221;, &#8220;Elvis <strong>swam</strong> fast&#8221;, etc. Both phrases don&#8217;t show up in a google search by the way.) So <strong>the real number of words should be a few fold larger than a dictionary indicates</strong>.</p>
<p>But <strong>not all words are equally likely to be chosen</strong> &#8212; just as <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/12/realworld_passw.html">some characters are more popular in passwords</a>. My earlier figure of &#8220;250000<sup>3</sup> 3 word combinations&#8221; was based on the naive assumption that each of the 3 words is <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_variable">independent</a>. But <a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cognitivedaily/2007/02/is_17_the_most_random_number.php">people do not pick things at random</a>. And a phrase is <em>by definition</em> not completely random &#8212; it must have <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subject_Verb_Object">some structure</a>. I&#8217;m unaware of research into exactly how predictable people are when making-up pass-phrases. </p>
<p>But given how <em>terrible</em> we are at picking good passwords, and how good we are at remembering non-nonsense-words, I am optimistic that we can remember pass-phrases that are orders of magnitude harder to guess than the &#8220;good&#8221; passwords we can&#8217;t remember today.</p>
<h3>Fewer Ways To Fail</h3>
<p>We&#8217;ve all locked ourselves out of an account because of typos or <a href="http://imlocation.wordpress.com/2007/07/28/caps-lock/">caps lock</a>. But pass-phrases can be more forgiving.</p>
<p>Pass-phrases are case<em>in</em>sensitive. There&#8217;s no need to lock someone out over &#8220;ELvis&#8230;&#8221;.</p>
<p>Common typos can be auto-corrected, much as google automatically suggests words. Consider the authentication attempt &#8220;Elvis <em>Swimmms</em> fast&#8221;. The system could recognize that &#8220;Swimms&#8221; isn&#8217;t a word, and try the most likely correction, &#8220;Elvis <strong>Swimms</strong> fast&#8221; &#8212; if it matches, then there&#8217;s no reason to ask the user if it&#8217;s what they really meant. (Note that only one pass-phrase is checked per login attempt.) I don&#8217;t have hard data here, but given how successful google is at interpreting typos, I&#8217;d expect such a system to work very well.</p>
<p>Pass-phrases might be more difficult on Phones, and similarly <a href="http://rands.tumblr.com/post/93333051/roughly-30-apology">awkward to write with</a> devices. Writing more letters means more work. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predictive_text">Predictive text</a> can only do so much. Repeatedly typing 3 letters <em>and</em> accepting a suggestion is clearly more work then just tapping out 6 characters. Additionally, there are security concerns with a predictive text system remembering your pass-phrase, or even a small part of it. </p>
<p>But for computers, pass phrases look like a clear usability win.</p>
<h3>Easily Secure Conclusion</h3>
<p>(In case you were wondering <a href="http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&#038;q=%22Easily+Secure+Conclusion%22&#038;btnG=Search&#038;aq=f&#038;oq=&#038;aqi=">that was a unique phrase</a> when I wrote this.) Using pass-<em>phrases</em> over passwords (which are really pass-strings-of-nonsense-sybols-that-<a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/06/write_down_your.html">nobody-can-remember</a>) makes a system significantly harder to crack. Pass-phrases are easier for humans to remember, and a system that uses them can be very forgiving. But as always, the devil is in the details. It&#8217;s terrifying to be an early adopter of a new security practice, even if it seems sound.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/06/01/pass-phrases-not-passwords/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>7</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Secret Questions Are a Bad Idea</title>
		<link>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/05/26/secret-questions-are-a-bad-idea/</link>
		<comments>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/05/26/secret-questions-are-a-bad-idea/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2009 07:20:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Vincent Gable</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Design]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quotes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Usability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Google]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Password]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://vgable.com/blog/2009/05/26/secret-questions-are-a-bad-idea/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Secret questions are an easier way for someone to hack your account. I don&#8217;t see that they offer much over asking people to pick an insecurely convenient password. Here&#8217;s some data on how insecure secret questions are, Acquaintance with whom participants reported being unwilling to share their webmail passwords were able to guess 17% of [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-081.html">Secret questions are an easier way for someone to hack your account.</a> I don&#8217;t see that they offer much over asking people to pick an insecurely <em>convenient</em> password.</p>
<p>Here&#8217;s some data on how insecure secret questions are,</p>
<blockquote><p> Acquaintance with whom participants reported being unwilling to share their webmail passwords were able to <strong>guess 17% of their answers</strong> (to &#8220;secret&#8221; questions). Participants <strong>forgot 20% of their own answers</strong> within six months. What&#8217;s more, <strong>13% of answers could be guessed within five attempts by guessing the most popular answers</strong> of other participants, though this weakness is partially attributable to the geographic homogeneity of our participant pool.</p></blockquote>
<p>&#8211; <a href="http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=79594"><cite><br />
It&#8217;s no secret: Measuring the security and reliability of authentication via &#8216;secret&#8217; questions</cite>, Stuart Schechter, A. J. Bernheim Brush, Serge Egelman, 17 May 2009</a></p>
<p>(Via <a href="http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/05/secret_question.html">Bruce Schneier</a>)</p>
<p>It&#8217;s important to note that <strong>people often forget answers to their own secret questions</strong>. Anecdotally, I&#8217;ve had to call my bank twice because I forgot <em>exactly</em> how I typed in my answers. </p>
<p>Forgetting the answer to a secret question can be <em>embarrassing</em>, unlike forgetting a password. I once got my mother&#8217;s maiden name wrong repeatedly. It was pretty awkward. (A credit card was also in my mother&#8217;s name, so when they asked &#8220;for my mother&#8217;s maiden name&#8221; they really meant <em>her</em> mother&#8217;s maiden name.)</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know of any statistics on how often accounts are compromised by secret questions. But there have been high-profile cases, like <a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/palin-e-mail-ha/">Sarah Palin&#8217;s email</a>,</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8230;the Palin hack didn’t require any real skill. Instead, the hacker simply reset Palin’s password using her birthdate, ZIP code and information about where she met her spouse — <strong>the security question on her Yahoo account, which was answered (Wasilla High) by a simple Google search</strong>.</p></blockquote>
<p><a href="http://www.schneier.com/essay-081.html">Bruce Schneier says,</a> &#8220;Passwords have reached the end of their useful life. Today, they only work for low-security applications. The secret question is just one manifestation of that fact.&#8221; If you must use password authentication, then don&#8217;t weaken it further with a questionable back door.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/05/26/secret-questions-are-a-bad-idea/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Control Screen Saver Security With Automator</title>
		<link>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/01/20/control-screen-saver-security-with-automator/</link>
		<comments>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/01/20/control-screen-saver-security-with-automator/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Jan 2009 06:40:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Vincent Gable</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Announcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Automator]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IMLocation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Password]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Screensaver]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://vgable.com/blog/2009/01/20/control-screen-saver-security-with-automator/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Set Screen Saver Security sets the time until the screen saver activates, and whether a password is required to unlock the screen saver. Every company I&#8217;ve worked for that had an office also had a rule that any computer in the office had to be password-protected with a screensaver that kicked in pretty quickly. But [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://vgable.com/files/Set%20Screen%20Saver%20Security.action.zip">Set Screen Saver Security</a> sets the time until the screen saver activates, and whether a password is required to unlock the screen saver.</p>
<p><img src="http://vgable.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/preview.png" alt="Preview.png" border="0" width="562" height="155" align="center" /></p>
<p>Every company I&#8217;ve worked for that had an office also had a rule that any computer in the office had to be password-protected with a screensaver that kicked in pretty quickly.  But at home it&#8217;s annoying to have to unlock your own laptop when you get up to make a sandwich.</p>
<p>If you use the same computer at home and in the office, <a href="http://vgable.com/imlocation/">IMLocation</a> can use this action to lock down your computer at work, but leave it easy-to-use at home.</p>
<p>I recommend <a href="http://vgable.com/imlocation/">trying IMLocation</a> (which includes the Set Screen Saver Security action) for best results.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://vgable.com/blog/2009/01/20/control-screen-saver-security-with-automator/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>

